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The Ever Increasing Attack Surface of the electric Energy Grid 
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Basic Components of the Electric Energy Grid Cyberspace 
Bulk Power System 
Distribution/Customer Level 
Need to utilize customer flexibility drives to the concept of IoTE 
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Vulnerabilities 
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Hackers can: 
 Cause severe disruptions to electric grid 
 Cause severe damage to major electric grid components 
 Manipulate voltages at customers causing failures 
Example 1: GPS Spoofing 
 Electric energy systems depend on GPS synchronized 
 measurements. Spoofing GPS receivers can lead to relay 
 mis-operations and compromised operational security 
Example 2: AURORA Attack/Controller Attack 
 Closing of generator breaker while generator is at standstill 
Example 3: Distribution System Controller Attack 
 Access controllers of transformers, reclosers, cap banks, 
 and manipulate voltages at customers causing massive 
 appliance failures 
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7 BCD Seconds of Minute (0-59) 
7 BCD Minutes of Hour (0-59) 
6 BCD Hours of Day (0-24) 
10 BCD Days of Year (0-366) 
9 BCD Year (last two digits) 
18 Binary Control Bits 
17 Binary Seconds of Day (0-86399) 
IRIG-B Frame Information Encoding 
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Satellite Elevation & Elevation Mask 
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Satellite Position/Speed 
and Receiver Position/Speed 
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Example 2: Controller Attack 
Hacker gains access to distribution system communications 
Distribution voltage control uses IEDs to control: 
• Load Tap Changer transformers 
• Voltage Regulators 
• Pole-top capacitor banks 
A Successful Hacker can enter the communications network and 
drive all controls to maximum. In a typical system this may lead to 
30% overvoltage causing widespread transformer failures and 
customer equipment failures (air-conditioners, stereos, refrigerators, 
etc.) 
QUESTION: How secure are distribution system communications networks? 
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Example Controller Attack 
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Example 1: AURORA Attack 
Closing of generator breaker while generator is at standstill 
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Standards 
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• IEEE, CIGRE, NIST, NERC, FERC all are 
involved in developing cyber security 
standards 
 
• NIST Cyber Security Framework  
    (v 1.0 in Feb 2014) 
 
• NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
Standards 
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IEEE Standards  
 IEEE Std 1686 ―IEEE Standard for Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) Cyber 
 Security Capabilities‖  
 IEEE C37.240 ―Standard for Cyber Security Requirements for Substation Automation, 
 Protection and Control Systems‖ (under development)  
 IEEE Std 1402 ―Guide for Electric Power Substation Physical and Electronic Security‖  
 IEEE Std 1711 ―IEEE Trial-Use Standard for a Cryptographic Protocol for Cyber 
 Security of Substation Serial Links‖  
IEC Standards  
 IEC 62351  
NERC Standards  
 NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) CIP-002 to CIP-009  
NIST  
 NISTIR 7628, Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security: Vol. 1, Smart Grid Cyber 
 Security Strategy, Architecture, and High-Level Requirements  
Example Cyber Security Standards 
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IEC Series of Standards 
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IEEE Std C37-240 
 









Effectively maps NISTIR 
7628 into the substation 
system. 
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IEEE Standard 1686 
 
IEEE Standard for 
Intelligent Electronic 
Devices Cyber Security 
Capabilities 
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IEEE Standard 1686 
 
IEEE Standard for 
Intelligent Electronic 
Devices Cyber Security 
Capabilities 
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Typical Present Practice 
 
• RADIUS is popular in the electric energy sector. 
• RADIUS is a client/server protocol that runs in application layer, 
using UDP as transport.  
• Clients are network access servers—such as wireless access points, 
802.1X-capable switches, virtual private network (VPN) servers, and 
dial-up servers 
 
It serves three purposes: 
1. Authenticate users or devices before granting access to 
 network and devices 
2. Authorize users or devices for specific network services 
3. Account for usage of services 
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Typical Present Practice 
 
• Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) 
 
• Confidentiality – encryption of data exchanges between substations.  
 
• Integrity – routers at each end of communications (checksum or hush 
value of data) 
 
• Authentication (signatures and certificates) 
 
• Provides interoperable, high quality, cryptographically-based security for 
IPv4 and IPv6 
 
• Transparent to applications 
 
• Internet Key Exchange (IKE) 
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Need More… 
New Approaches 
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Data Flow / Applications 
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State and Model Tracking Based Approaches 
Minimize/Eliminate False Positives 
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Physically Based Integrated Physical and Cyber 
System co-Model (PB-PCcoM) 
The physical power system (a substation PC co-model is shown) is modeled in terms of its physical construction 
(3-phase breaker-oriented); the cyber system consisting of relays, instrumentation, communications and human 
interfaces is integrated with the physical system. Any changes in the physical system propagate to the cyber 
system and any command at the cyber layer is transmitted to the physical system. This co-modeling approach 
was introduced 30 years ago before cyber security was a concern. 
The integrated model 
enables co-simulation and 
evaluation of the complex 
interactions between the 
two systems. 
 
Most importantly enables 
(1) immediate detection 
and blockage of adversary 
data and (2) context 
based authentication or 
blockage of commands via 
the cyber system in a 
seamless and timely 
manner. Time response 
of the authentication 
process is an extremely 
important issue. 
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ARPAe Project - (GT, SouCo, NYPA, EPRI) 
Resilient Centralized Substation Protection and Control (rCSP)  
Core Technology: Dynamic State Estimation Based Centralized Protection Scheme 
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Data Integrity 
1. Instrumentation Channel Errors 
2. Hidden Failures 
3. Cyber Data Attacks 
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Effects of Input Data Accuracy  
Quality of Data is Affected from (a) Instrumentation Channel Errors, (b) 
Hidden Failures and (c) cyber data attacks. All Affect Performance of 
protective relays (legacy relays and setting-less relays). 
 
Relays and merging units are becoming more accurate by using higher 
resolution in data acquisition and higher sampling rates. 
 
Errors from instrumentation channels remain practically the same. 
Instrumentation channel errors have been much higher than the errors 
introduced by the data acquisition even in earlier generations of sensor 
less systems.  
 
Merging Units offer a unique opportunity to perform error correction within 
a merging unit  MU provides corrected data in primary quantities. 
 
Error correction enables more reliable detection of cyber data attacks 
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Impact of Hidden Failures/Cyber Attacks 
Hidden failures and cyber attacks corrupt the data ―seen‖ by a 
relay, legacy or setting-less protective relay. 
Hidden failures/cyber attacks will cause relay mis-operation 
whether it is a legacy or a setting-less protective relay. 
Need to identify hidden failures/cyber attacks and avert relay 
mis-operations. 
Present State of Art: Some legacy relaying schemes can 
identify some hidden failures and inhibit relay operation. No 
capability to take corrective action. No capability to detect 
data alteration by cyber-attacks. 
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Proposed Method for Securing Data 
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Proposed Method for Securing Data 
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Dynamic State Estimation Based 
Centralized Protection Scheme (rCSP)  
Hypothesis Testing: Observations 
 At substation level redundancy is high (over 2000%) 
 System is continuously running.  
 Probability of simultaneous failure events is low  
Hypothesis Testing: Mechanics  
Identify suspect measurements from residuals  
Group suspect data with certain criteria 
Determine ―faulted devices‖ from setting-less relays output 
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Dynamic State Estimation Based Centralized 
Protection Scheme (rCSP)  
Hypothesis Type 1 (H1): (determine if a hidden failure exists) Remove suspect 
measurements and rerun DSE. If probability high  removed measurements are 
bad  identify  root cause  issue diagnostics  replace bad data with 
estimated values. End hypothesis testing. Otherwise go to H2. 
 
Hypothesis Type 2 (H2): (determine if a fault decision is correct). For the reported 
faulted device, remove all internal device measurements and remove the faulted 
device model from the substation model. Then rerun DSE.  If probability high  the 
device is truly experiencing an internal fault.  Allow zone relay to trip the faulted 
device. End hypothesis testing. 
 
Hypothesis Type 3 (H3): (simultaneous hidden failure and fault) This test 
combines type 1 and type 2 hypothesis testing to cover the case of a simultaneous 
fault and a hidden failure. If affirmative, end hypothesis testing. Otherwise go to H4. 
 
Hypothesis Type 4 (H4): (cyber attack) Remove data originating from an IED. 
Then rerun DSE. If probability high  the IED has been compromised. 
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Examples of 
Intrusion 
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Numerical Example 




Sequence of Events  













5 Protection Zones: 
– 115 kV Transmission Line    
– 115 kV Bus 
– 115/13.8 kV , 36 MVA Transformer  
– 13.8 kV Bus 
– 13.8 kV Distribution Line (one of the two) 
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Numerical Example  
















1.500 s 3.121 s
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Numerical Example  
Case1: Primary Fuse Blown Y-Y, PT-4A 





















0.000 s 4.992 s
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Numerical Example  
Case1: Primary Fuse Blown Y-Y, PT-4A 
Compromised Data Correction : 
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Example of Intrusion Detection 
Before Attack 
Data Attack Experiments: 
• Attackers were given access to system.  
• They stage their own attacks, system does not monitor their activity. 
• Attack  Change Relay Settings: from 1200:5 to 2400:5 
After Attack 
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Example of Intrusion Detection 
Performance Characteristics: 
• Detection of data attack is almost instantaneous (25 ms or less). It is 
detected at the first execution of the dynamic state estimation after the 
attack. Dynamic state estimation executes once per 16.66 ms. 
• Identification of compromised device is also fast (an additional 8 ms) by 
hypothesis testing. It also provides probability of certainty. 
• Corrective actions: (a) quarantine compromised device, (b) block any 
access to the system, (c) sanitize and restore. 
• Assuming that attacks can occur at one device at a time, an attack can 
be foiled and stopped in real time.  
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Context Based Command Authentication  
• Capture command,  
 
• Determine effect of command on 
system using real time model and 
faster than real time simulation and  
 
• Authenticate/Block command on the 
basis of the effects on the system.  
Cybersecurity Lecture Series  
August 23, 2019 44 
Example of Intrusion Detection 
Attack Experiments: Attackers were given access to system. They 
stage their own attacks, system does not monitor their activity. 
Attack: at time t = 2.5 sec, a malicious control is sent to open the 
breaker of the Eastgate-Scenic Hills line in the Eastgate substation  
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SouthernCo - Georgia Tech Work 
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GT Laboratory (PSCAL)  
Dedicated Lab for Protection, Control & Cyber Security Testing: Continuous Operation of Fully 
Automated Substation: Complete Substation Cyber Infrastructure 
Configuration is a full replica of the IT 
infrastructure of a modern substation 
with multi-vendor equipment 
 
Combines numerical relay architecture 
with new architectures based on 
merging units. 
 
It is driven by a high fidelity simulator 
capable of reproducing real life 
conditions 
 
Unique capability for simultaneous 
testing of protection, control and cyber 
security 
 
Enables realistic testing of Intrusion 
Detection System in an almost field 
conditions environment using the PB-
PCcoM approach. 
Additional Cyber Security 
Encrypted Hash generated by MU 
and embedded in streaming data 
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Concluding Remarks 
The industry supported by IEEE and CIGRE Efforts Move 
Towards the DIGITAL SUBSTATION. 
The entire process is becoming fully automated (many 
efforts towards autonomy) with self healing capabilities 
against data errors, hidden failures and cyber attacks. 
The technologies under development offer three distinct 
benefits:  
 (a) Drastically improved operational reliability 
 (b) Reliable defenses against cyber attacks 
 (c) Reduced Cost 
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Τέλος 
